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OF OUTSIDE MONITORS AND INSIDE MONITORS: 
THE ROLE OF JOURNALISTS IN CAREMARK 
LITIGATION 
Michael J. Borden* 
ABSTRACT 
In this article I argue for a change in Delaware corporate law that 
would allow for competitive forces to improve the quality of corporate 
compliance programs, thus reducing harm to society from corporate 
illegality and improving shareholder welfare.  Specifically, courts should 
remove some obstacles that prevent plaintiffs in shareholder derivative 
actions from forcing defendant directors to demonstrate the efficacy of 
their compliance programs in cases where outside monitoring by journalists 
appears to have detected illegal corporate actions before those actions have 
been detected by the internal monitoring of the compliance department.  
Currently, the rigorous demand requirement and the deferential good faith 
standard in duty to monitor cases cause most Caremark claims to be 
dismissed at the demand phase, thus shielding defendant directors from 
revealing information about the performance of their compliance programs.  
The changes I suggest will force corporate defendants to reveal information 
that will allow courts to compare the monitoring performed by journalists 
with that done by compliance programs.  Where the outside monitors are 
outperforming the inside monitors, directors may be responsible for failing 
to perform their duty to monitor, which requires them to establish systems 
to detect and report illegal behavior by employees.  By implementing the 
modest changes I suggest, Delaware courts will, over time, have more 
information to help them assess whether their approach to the duty to 
monitor needs a more thorough overhaul. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Competition lies at the heart of our capitalist system.  It is an article of 
faith among advocates of a laissez-faire approach to markets that 
competition, and not governmental intervention, will allow for the most 
efficient allocation of goods and services throughout an economy.  
Corporate law provides one particularly pure example of this reluctance of 
the state to interfere in private ordering.  The business judgment rule, a 
central principle of corporate law, on some level can scarcely be called a 
legal principle at all.  Rather, it is a doctrine of abstinence founded on the 
notion that courts should refrain from meddling in the corporate 
boardroom.  Yet as we have seen with disheartening regularity in the years 
since Enron’s collapse, competitive forces in markets do not always serve 
to prevent corporate actors from causing tremendous harm to shareholders 
and society by engaging in wrongful activities of various sorts. 
Corporate law makes a token effort to induce corporate directors to 
reduce the likelihood of such malfeasance by imposing a duty to monitor, 
which requires that corporations have compliance departments tasked with 
ensuring that corporate employees abide by applicable law.  This article 
argues that the duty to monitor, in its current form, is too weak to cause 
corporations to establish truly effective compliance programs.  I argue that 
journalists can serve as outside monitors that compete with the inside 
monitoring performed by compliance programs.  In cases where the outside 
monitors outperform the inside monitors, the law should allow shareholder 
plaintiffs to use that fact to overcome the procedural hurdles that usually 
prevent them from surviving a motion to dismiss when they sue.  By 
relaxing these procedural obstacles, the law will allow competitive forces 
to create pressure on corporations to do more to avoid socially harmful and 
shareholder wealth-reducing illegality. 
There is good reason to believe that journalists can be effective 
monitors of corporate wrongdoing.  The summer of 2012 saw the 
revelation of a stunning international banking scandal that demonstrated 
journalists’ ability to serve the public good by detecting and reporting 
corporate criminality.  The LIBOR rate-setting scandal serves as an 
instance of a purely market-based process manipulated by powerful 
insiders to the detriment of those who rely on the integrity of international 
lending rates.  Gary Gensler, the chairman of the Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission, revealed that “there were articles in the spring of 
2008 by the Wall Street Journal” following which “staff and [CFTC’s] 
division of enforcement started to take a look . . . and tried to learn” about 
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the scandal.
1
  Gensler’s comments suggest that regulators and the public 
depend on journalists to assist in law enforcement and to ensure that 
markets function.  Corporate law should take advantage of this extralegal 
constraint by modifying the duty to monitor to clear the way for journalists 
to make their contributions. 
Over fifteen years have passed since Chancellor Allen’s celebrated 
opinion in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, and 
courts, lawyers, and scholars are still struggling with a fundamental 
question of corporate law and governance:  to what extent are corporate 
directors responsible for monitoring the behavior of corporate employees 
and ensuring their compliance with the law?  This question is so important 
because, apart from raising interesting and difficult legal questions, it 
implicates social issues that have captured the nation’s attention since the 
Enron and WorldCom scandals, and more recently with the mortgage 
finance catastrophe and the LIBOR scandal.  In this respect, Caremark 
litigation differs from many other topics in corporate law, which mainly 
concern the relationship between shareholders and boards of directors. 
These recent corporate fiascos have demonstrated that social harms 
that can result from a failure of oversight and the corporate culture of 
lawlessness it can engender.  However, corporate law does not provide an 
easy answer to the question of if or how to hold directors liable for the 
wrongs of corporate employees.  On one hand, the board is the entity 
charged by statute with the duty to manage the affairs of the corporation.  
Thus, it may seem desirable to lay responsibility for corporate wrongdoing 
at the feet of directors.  On the other hand, a directorship of a public 
corporation is in reality a part-time job held by individuals with many other 
significant responsibilities.  It may be unreasonable to expect directors to 
ensure that none of a corporation’s thousands of employees harm the 
corporation or the public by breaking the law. 
Caremark and its progeny have attempted to resolve this dilemma by 
fashioning a duty to monitor that requires boards to establish, in good faith, 
a reasonably designed information and reporting system—a compliance 
program—to monitor adherence to positive law.  While no one would 
argue that compliance programs are a bad thing, the decade and a half of 
litigation following Caremark has demonstrated that the “in good faith” 
standard is mostly snarl, with very little bite.  This deferential standard, 
combined with well-entrenched procedural hurdles, create the risk that 
compliance programs can become paper tigers:  legally sufficient to pass 
Caremark muster, but practically ineffective to prevent wrongdoing.  The 
 
 1.  The Diane Rehm Show: The Global Banking Scandal (WAMU 88.5 FM 
Washington DC broadcast Jul. 9, 2012), http://thedianerehmshow.org/shows/2012-07-
09/global-banking-scandal/transcript). 
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jurisprudence suggests that the threat of liability is not a serious concern for 
directors.  Of the 248 cases brought under Delaware law alleging 
Caremark-type violations, only fourteen times did the Caremark claim 
survive the motion to dismiss.
2
  Plaintiffs achieved an adjudication of 
liability only once.
3
 
One of the greatest barriers to success for plaintiffs in shareholder 
derivative litigation is the Delaware rule, which denies discovery until after 
the demand phase.  Without discovery, plaintiffs are relegated to what the 
Delaware courts call the “tools at hand,” mainly SEC filings, public 
records, and news media reports.  These tools have been insufficient to 
generate the particularized facts the plaintiffs must plead to survive a 
motion to dismiss.  This Article will argue that courts should give particular 
weight to journalists’ reports of corporate illegality, both at the demand 
phase and when applying the substantive standard of good faith.  This focus 
on journalists expands on an earlier article I wrote titled The Role of 
Financial Journalists in Corporate Governance.  In that article, I surveyed 
the various ways that financial journalists influence corporate law and 
corporate governance.  In the context of Caremark, I argued that journalists 
could serve as a sort of competitive benchmark against which to assess the 
efficacy of corporate compliance programs.  I reasoned that if the external 
monitoring by journalists could discover corporate wrongdoing before the 
internal monitors are able to discover and report it to the board, then there 
would be reason to suspect that the Caremark standard was, in fact, 
promoting inert compliance systems. 
Part I of this Article explains Caremark and its progeny, detailing its 
development and the difficulties it presents for plaintiffs.  Part II provides 
background on the recent increase in scholarly attention paid to journalists’ 
impact on the law.  Part III explores the role journalists have played in 
Caremark litigation.  In Part IV, I discuss my proposal for relaxing the 
demand requirement and creating a presumption of bad faith when 
journalistic reporting of illegality appears to predate any attempt by the 
board to address the wrongdoing. 
 
2.  For examples of Caremark claims that failed to survive a motion to dismiss, see, e.g., In 
re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2003) (overturning the 
district court’s granting of a motion to dismiss); McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 
2001) (same); In re Pfizer Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 722 F. Supp. 2d 453, 461 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (excusing investors from making pre-suit demand on corporation’s board 
after they demonstrated substantial likelihood that majority of board members faced 
personal liability). 
 3.  ATR-Kim Eng. Fin. Corp. v. Araneta, No. 489-N, 2006 WL 4782272, at *1 (Del. 
Ch. Dec. 21, 2006). 
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I. CAREMARK AND ITS PROGENY 
Corporate employees, at all levels of the organizational structure, 
sometimes break the law in their efforts to carry out the company’s 
business. The consequences of such law-breaking can be severe, causing 
significant losses of shareholder wealth.  Such losses often prompt 
shareholders to sue directors for damages to compensate the corporation for 
the loss.  At the heart of the law’s lenient response to such lawsuits is the 
recognition that directors cannot be expected to know what every corporate 
employee is doing, and thus cannot be held liable for every instance of law 
breaking that harms the firm financially.
4
  Indeed, though it may not be 
polite for courts to mention it, a degree of law-breaking in market conduct 
often benefits shareholders.  The courts have struggled for decades to find 
an appropriate intermediate position between the extremes of making the 
board the guarantor of corporate rectitude and encouraging an aloof, 
“ignorance is bliss” attitude among directors. 
A. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers 
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.
5
 was the first notable 
case to explore this middle ground.  In Graham, shareholders sued the 
board for failing to prevent harm to the corporation caused by illegal price 
fixing.  Relying on a 19
th
 century U.S. Supreme Court decision,
6
 the 
Delaware Supreme Court ruled that directors could be held liable for 
corporate illegality only if “something occurs to put them on suspicion that 
something is wrong.”
7
  The Delaware Supreme Court disparaged the notion 
that there was any “duty . . . to install . . . a corporate system of espionage 
to ferret out wrongdoing.”
8
  In effect, the Graham court established the 
“one-bite rule for dog owners” in the context of the duty to monitor.
9
  So 
 
 4.  See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Star Lopez & Benjamin Oklan, The Convergence of 
Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 561 (2008) (“Directors are not expected 
to know in minute detail everything that happens on a day-to-day basis . . . Delaware case 
law was unclear for many years as to whether boards have an obligation to monitor 
proactively the conduct of corporate subordinates.”). 
 5.  Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). 
 6.  Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891). 
 7.  Graham, 188 A.2d at 130. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  See Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 577-78 (analogizing the rule of Graham to the 
aphorism that every dog is entitled to one bite.  The authors explain, “At common law, of 
course, the one-bite rule actually was somewhat more complicated.  When a dog bit 
someone, the master could be held liable only if the master knew or had reason to know the 
dog had a propensity to bite.  A prior bite would constitute the requisite knowledge, thus 
giving rise to the colloquial name for the rule, but the requisite knowledge also could be 
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long as there were no red flags indicating a likelihood of the wrongdoing in 
question, the board could not be held responsible if it occurred.  Perhaps 
unwittingly, the Graham court thus established a legal environment in 
which boards had an incentive to avoid discovering wrongdoing.  In any 
event, Graham did not impose an affirmative duty for Delaware 
corporations to establish  compliance programs.  Graham remained good 
law until 1996, when the Delaware Chancery handed down the Caremark
10
 
decision—a landmark case that is seen as standing for the proposition that 
corporate directors have an affirmative duty to monitor their corporations 
for illegal activities.
11
 
B. Caremark 
Caremark International, Inc. was a Delaware corporation that 
marketed medical products and services to patients and to medical 
providers.
12
  In violation of federal Medicare and Medicaid law, Caremark 
employees paid kickbacks to doctors and hospital administrators who 
prescribed their products and services.
13
  A federal investigation of the 
company culminated in Caremark paying $250 million in fines and 
penalties.
14
  When shareholders sued the board of directors for the loss of 
corporate wealth, the directors claimed that they were unaware of the 
wrongdoing.
15
  Such a defense is entirely plausible, for directors generally 
are not engaged in the day-to-day business operations of their firms.  
Moreover, modern corporations are geographically diverse organizations  
that often have thousands of employees and multiple layers of management 
oversight.  Under such circumstances, it would be harsh or unfeasible to 
hold directors personally responsible for the harm caused by actors far 
removed from the control of the the directors.  Indeed, at the time of the 
wrongdoing in Caremark, Delaware law under Graham held that so long as 
directors were unaware of the unlawful activities that had caused the harm 
to the corporation and had no reason to be aware of it, the directors were 
 
based on the breed’s inherently violent propensities.”). 
 10.  In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 11.  See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 
2006) (holding “that Caremark articulates the necessary conditions predicate for director 
oversight liability:  (a) the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information 
system or controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed 
to monitor or oversee its operations . . . .”). 
 12.  Caremark, 698 A.2d at 959-64. 
 13.  Id. at 962. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. at 971. 
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free from personal liability.
16
 
In an opinion approving the settlement of the Caremark shareholders’ 
derivative action, Chancellor Allen acknowledged that Graham might be 
seen as promoting blissful ignorance for directors and undertook to put the 
law on a different footing.
17
  Allen asserted that if this interpretation of 
Graham was really the law of Delaware, then it must change.
18
  In dicta, 
Allen explained that in order to avoid liability for corporate wrongdoing, 
the board must “exercise a good faith judgment that the corporation’s 
information and reporting system is in concept and design adequate to 
assure the board that appropriate information will come to its attention in a 
timely manner as a matter of ordinary operations . . . .”
19
  In so doing, 
Chancellor Allen moved the discussion about personal director liability 
away from the business judgment rule and towards the rubric of the duty of 
good faith.
20
 
But good faith, by its nature, is a rather elastic and fact-dependent  
concept.  It is the sort of standard that typically leads to unpredictability in 
litigation, leaving directors and the bar wondering about what behavior 
amounts to good or bad faith.  Perhaps eager to simplify this guessing 
game, Chancellor Allen proceeded to clarify the meaning of good faith in 
the context of the duty to monitor: 
Generally where a claim of directorial liability for corporate loss 
is predicated upon ignorance of liability creating activities within 
the corporation, . . . only a sustained or systematic failure of the 
board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to 
assure a reasonable information and reporting system exits—will 
establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to 
liability.  Such a test of liability—lack of good faith as evidenced 
by sustained or systematic failure of a director to exercise 
reasonable oversight—is quite high.
21
 
Chancellor Allen further opined that the sort of claim involved in the 
case was “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which 
a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”
22
  This is a strong statement, 
 
 16.  Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963). 
 17.  Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969-70. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. at 970. 
 20.  In 2006, Stone v. Ritter made clear that the duty of good faith was not an 
independent fiduciary duty, creating a “triumvirate” of fiduciary duties along with care and 
loyalty.  Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).  
Rather, the duty of good faith falls under the duty of loyalty for doctrinal and analytical 
purposes under Delaware law.  Id.   
 21.  Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971. 
 22.  Id. at 967. 
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given the utter nullity that the waste doctrine has been for decades.
23
  
In short, we can say that Caremark requires corporations to have a 
compliance program reasonably designed in good faith.  Corporate law 
does not require that the program function; it merely must exist.   In the 
sixteen years since Caremark, plaintiffs have brought approximately 250 
cases alleging violations of Delaware’s duty to monitor.  The Caremark 
claim survived a motion to dismiss only fourteen times.
24
  Only one case 
has produced a verdict for plaintiffs.
25
 
There are several possible reasons why plaintiffs have fared so 
dismally under Caremark.  It may be that the good faith standard for 
legally sufficient compliance programs is too low.  It is also possible that 
the vast majority of cases lacked merit.  A third reason may be that the 
demand requirement magnifies the difficulties shareholder plaintiffs face.
26
 
In view of Chancellor Allen’s own prognosis, and the actual 
experience of fifteen years of Caremark litigation, it is fair to wonder 
whether the Caremark good faith standard has proven too deferential to 
directors and whether it has promoted the creation and maintenance of 
paper tigers—inert compliance programs that are legally sufficient but 
inadequate to curb wrongdoing.  With the vast majority of cases disposed 
of on the pleadings, defendants are not required to demonstrate that the 
compliance programs are actually performing their intended function:  
monitoring corporate behavior to assure compliance with law and to report 
relevant information to the board.  The procedural advantage that 
defendants enjoy shields them from having to prove the effectiveness of 
their information and reporting systems.  Indeed, even in the rare case that 
does go to trial, the effectiveness of the compliance system is not even at 
issue; it must be  “in concept and design adequate to assure the board that 
appropriate information will come to its attention in a timely manner as a 
matter of ordinary operations . . . .”
27
  By focusing only on “concept and 
design,” Chancellor Allen remained consistent with the general thrust of 
 
 23.  See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 46 (2004) (noting that “cases in which 
it is possible to demonstrate ‘waste’ are—like the Loch Ness Monster—so rare as to be 
possibly nonexistent.”). 
 24.  See, e.g., In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 
2003) (overturning the district court’s granting of a motion to dismiss); McCall v. Scott, 239 
F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2001) (same); In re Pfizer Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litig., 722 F. 
Supp. 2d 453, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (excusing investors from making pre-suit demand on 
corporation’s board after they demonstrated substantial likelihood that majority of board 
members faced personal liability). 
 25.  ATR-Kim Eng. Fin. Corp. v. Araneta, No. 489-N, 2006 WL 4782272, at *1, *20 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2006).  
 26.  For further discussion of the demand requirement, see infra section D. 
 27.  Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970. 
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Delaware corporate law.  It is a bedrock tenet of the business judgment rule 
that the director’s duty of care involves only the process of decision-
making, not the substantive decision reached.
28
  Unfortunately, this analytic 
consistency of deference to directorial autonomy may come at a steep price 
for shareholders and society, as the numerous corporate scandals of the past 
decade have demonstrated. 
C. Stone v. Ritter: An Exercise in Taxonomy 
Caremark’s doctrinal impact on shareholder derivative litigation 
cannot be fully grasped without considering Stone ex rel. AmSouth 
Bancorporation v. Ritter,
29
 a 2006 case that both adopted Caremark’s dicta 
as the law of Delaware and radically re-interpreted its doctrinal 
foundations.
30
  Caremark’s analysis of a board’s duty of good faith in 
exercising oversight appeared to be grounded in the duty of care.  For 
example, the opinion stated that “the core element of any corporate law 
duty of care inquiry” is “whether there was good faith effort to be informed 
and exercise judgment.”
31
 
What should be understood, but may not be widely considered by 
courts or commentators, is that compliance with a director’s duty of care 
can never be judicially determined by reference to the content of the board 
decision that leads to a corporate loss, apart from consideration of the good 
faith or rationality of the process employed.
32
 
The Stone court thus faced a Caremark decision that seemed to 
commit Delaware law to two doctrinal positions:  first, that good faith was 
the touchstone for any analysis of a claim of a board’s failure to exercise 
appropriate oversight, and, second, that such a claim was grounded in the 
duty of care.  Stone embraced the first concept but emphatically discarded 
the second.
33
  The years immediately following Caremark saw a degree of 
confusion concerning the appropriate place of good faith in the taxonomy 
of corporate fiduciary duties.  Some in the Delaware bar and bench had 
begun to embrace a view of Delaware corporate law as embodying a triad 
of fiduciary duties:  care, loyalty, and good faith.
34
  This view of fiduciary 
 
 28.  See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (“As for the plaintiffs’ 
contention that the directors failed to exercise ‘substantive due care,’ we should note that 
such a concept is foreign to the business judgment rule . . . . Due care in the decisionmaking 
context is process due care only.”). 
 29.  Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
 30.  Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 585-86. 
 31.  Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Stone, 911 A.2d at 369-70. 
 34.  See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001) (“The directors 
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duties was the subject of some handwringing, among both judges and 
scholars.
35
  The Stone court put an end to this construct, clarifying that “the 
obligation to act in good faith does not establish an independent fiduciary 
duty that stands on the same footing as the duties of care and loyalty,” but 
rather is subsumed by the duty of loyalty.
36
 
The decision to place the duty of good faith under the rubric of the 
duty of loyalty has interesting implications for shareholder suits.  Steven 
Bainbridge suggests that Stone’s placement of good faith in the duty of 
loyalty threatens the coherence of the system of remedies available under 
the duty of loyalty.
37
  Bainbridge notes that Stone expands the duty of 
loyalty beyond its traditional bounds by including cases in which directors 
do not receive a personal benefit.
38
  Consequently, the remedies available in 
loyalty cases will change.  Before Stone, remedies in loyalty cases aimed at 
requiring defendants to disgorge benefits wrongfully gained.  For example, 
in corporate opportunity cases, the corporation receives a constructive trust 
in the opportunity.
39
  In interested director cases, the court may void the 
related party transaction.
40
  After Stone, duty of loyalty cases under the duty 
to monitor will involve claims for damages without a corresponding 
 
of Delaware corporations have a triad of primary fiduciary duties”); McMullin v. Beran, 765 
A.2d 910, 920 (Del. 2000) (noting that plaintiffs must successfully allege breach of one of 
the “triad of fiduciary duties of care, loyalty or good faith”); Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 
10 (Del. 1998) (en banc) (“The director’s fiduciary duty to both the corporation and its 
shareholders has been characterized by this Court as a triad:  due care, good faith, and 
loyalty.”).   
 35.  See, e.g., Robert Baker, In re Walt Disney: What It Means to the Definition of 
Good Faith, Exculpatory Clauses, and the Nature of Executive Compensation, 4 FLA. ST. U. 
BUS. REV. 261, 267-68 (2005) (discussing the duty of good faith); Carter G. Bishop, A Good 
Faith Revival of Duty of Care Liability in Business Organization Law, 41 TULSA L. REV. 
477, 482-83 (2006) (noting that “because loyalty, care, and good faith are not uniformly 
triadic, divergent corporate law standards . . . ha[ve] lead to intolerable confusion and 
incoherence.”); Matthew R. Berry, Comment, Does Delaware’s Section 102(b)(7) Protect 
Reckless Directors From Personal Liability? Only if Delaware Courts Act in Good Faith, 
79 WASH. L. REV. 1125, 1128 (2004) (“Delaware courts do not agree whether the duty of 
good faith is an independent fiduciary duty or merely a part of the duty of loyalty, but courts 
do agree that directors who act in bad faith are personally liable for any resulting 
damages.”).   
 36.  Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. 
 37.  Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 585-86.  See also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of 
Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006) (critiquing the placement of 
Caremark claims in the duty of loyalty); Leo E. Srine, Jr., Lawrence A. Hammermesh, R. 
Franklin Balotti, Jeffrey M. Gorris, Loyalty’s Core Demand: the Defining Role of Good 
Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629 (2010) (explaining that the duty of loyalty is, at 
its core, “the obligation to act in good faith to advance the best interests of the 
corporation.”). 
 38.  Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 585-86.  
 39.  Id.  
 40.  Id. 
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wrongful benefit to the defendants.  Bainbridge argues that such claims 
could raise challenging issues of causation that have not, to date, been part 
of litigation under the duty of loyalty.
41
 
But other effects of this re-configuration of the taxonomy of 
shareholder claims are likely to prove beneficial for shareholder plaintiffs, 
and thus may be beneficial to shareholder welfare generally.  As corporate 
law scholars have recognized,
42
 by placing good faith claims under the duty 
of loyalty and clarifying that they do not implicate the duty of care, 
Delaware courts have removed them from the exculpatory ambit of section 
102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law.
43
  Section 102(b)(7) 
permits corporations to include in their charters a provision insulating 
directors from liability for breaches of fiduciary duties, but section 
102(b)(7) prohibits exculpation in cases involving breaches of the duty of 
loyalty or for actions not in good faith.
44
  It is evident, then, that one of the 
consequences (if not the purpose) of Stone’s taxonomic maneuver was to 
remove Caremark claims from the class of cases in which directors enjoy 
immunity from liability.  But this benefit only partially clears the very 
uncertain path to a monetary recovery for shareholder plaintiffs. 
From the plaintiff’s perspective, the entire process of derivative 
litigation may seem like a cruel joke.  The set-up is a series of nearly 
insurmountable obstacles (no discovery, the onerous demand requirement, 
special litigation committees empowered to dismiss the rare case that 
survives the demand phase, and director-protective substantive rules of 
decision like the business judgment rule) and the punch line is section 
102(b)(7).  Stone, at a minimum, provides some relief for plaintiffs. 
D. The Demand Requirement 
Another important piece of the puzzle in Caremark litigation, as in all 
shareholder derivative suits, is the demand requirement—the most 
formidable of the procedural obstacles shareholder plaintiffs encounter.  
Because the real plaintiff in interest in a shareholder derivative action is the 
corporation itself, and because the board is the only entity with the 
authority to manage the affairs of the corporation, the law requires 
 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  See, e.g., John L. Reed & Matt Neiderman, “Good Faith” and the Ability of 
Directors to Assert Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law As a 
Defense to Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of 
Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111, 116-17 (2004) (“[C]ourts and commentators seem 
to agree that an exculpatory charter provision precludes monetary liability for pure ‘duty of 
care’ claims and not for duty of loyalty or ‘good faith’ claims.”). 
 43.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2013). 
 44.  Id. 
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shareholders to make a demand upon the board to bring the action that the 
shareholders are pressing.
45
  The demand requirement may be excused, 
however, if the plaintiffs can demonstrate that demand would be futile.
46
 
Since claims of failure to monitor usually involve nonfeasance, rather 
than an affirmative decision taken by the board, recent Caremark cases 
have employed the test of Rales v. Blasband
47
 to analyze demand futility.
48
  
The Rales test requires plaintiffs to establish reasonable doubt that “as of 
the time the complaint is filed, the board of directors could have properly 
exercised its independent and disinterested business judgment in 
responding to a demand.”
49
  Demand in a Caremark case will be excused as 
futile if the plaintiffs can plead “particularized facts that support an 
inference that the directors ‘did possess knowledge of facts suggesting 
potential . . . improprieties . . . and took no action to respond to them.’”
50
 
The test for demand futility intertwines with the substantive standard 
for success on the merits under Caremark and Stone.  As the court 
explained in McCall v. Scott, demand will be excused if the particularized 
facts alleged in the complaint present a substantial likelihood of liability on 
the part of the director.
51
  Assuming that a majority of board members are 
named as defendants, such a showing would suffice to raise the requisite 
reasonable doubt that the board as a whole would be unlikely to exercise 
independent and disinterested business judgment in responding to the 
demand.  The reasoning employed by the McCall court ruling for the 
plaintiffs on the demand issue suggests that in certain cases, overcoming 
the demand requirement might be an attainable goal.  But it is important to 
recognize that McCall was decided by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
applying Delaware law.  Recent Delaware cases give plaintiffs less reason 
for optimism. 
 
 45.  See White v. Panic, 793 A.2d 356, 371 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“[R]equiring demand in 
failure to monitor cases is consistent with the board’s managerial prerogatives because it 
permits the board to have the opportunity to take action where it has not previously 
considered doing so”) (internal quotations omitted).  
 46.  Id. at 371 
 47.  Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993). 
 48.  See Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 141 (Del. 2008) (“The second (Rales) test 
applies where the subject of a derivative suit is not a business decision of the Board but 
rather a violation of the Board’s oversight duties.”); DeSimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 
913 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“[T]he question of whether [Plaintiff] has satisfied his burden under 
Rule 23.1 must be answered by applying the test set forth in Rales v. Blasband.”); McCall v. 
Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 816 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[B]ecause this case involved the ‘absence of a 
conscious board decision,’ demand futility should be evaluated under the Rales test.”). 
 49.  Rales, 634 A.2d at 934. 
 50.  Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506-07 n.36 (Del. Ch. 2003) (quoting Ash v. 
McCall, No. Civ.A. 17132, 2000 WL 1370341 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000)). 
 51.  McCall, 239 F.3d at 818-19. 
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In Wood v. Baum, the Delaware Supreme Court explained that a 
“plaintiff must also plead particularized facts that demonstrate that the 
directors acted with scienter, i.e., that they had ‘actual or constructive 
knowledge’ that their conduct was legally improper.”
52
  In DeSimone v. 
Barrows, the Court of Chancery asserted that: 
[I]n order to state a viable Caremark claim . . . a plaintiff must 
plead the existence of facts suggesting that the board knew that 
internal controls were inadequate, that the inadequacies could 
leave room for illegal or materially harmful behavior, and that the 
board chose to do nothing about the control deficiencies that it 
knew existed.
53
 
The difficulty with the scienter requirement is that it is very difficult 
for plaintiffs to plead particularized facts about what the directors knew 
without the benefit of discovery.  Whether under the Rales test or the older 
Aronson
54
 test, a large majority of shareholder derivative actions meet their 
end at the demand phase of the litigation.  Yet, as mentioned previously, 
plaintiffs must obtain the particularized facts needed to establish demand 
futility without the benefit of discovery. 
The dictum from DeSimone indicates a gap between the jurisprudence 
of demand in the Delaware courts and the approach taken in cases like 
McCall.  Note that the focus is on the board’s knowledge of the 
deficiencies of internal controls, not on the board’s knowledge of any 
particular information about a given instance of illegality.  Only knowledge 
of a systematic failure of the structure of compliance will suffice to allow a 
plaintiff to demonstrate demand futility.
55
  Moreover, even if a plaintiff 
were able to demonstrate a structural deficiency in internal controls, such a 
showing could still be inadequate, for the plaintiff might not be able to 
show the board’s knowledge of the deficiency.  The incentive remains for 
directors to remain willfully ignorant of flaws in their compliance 
programs.   
It is evident, then, that in the microcosm of demand, we see a 
recapitulation of the broader issues surrounding the duty to monitor:  
directors cannot have knowledge of everything that occurs  within a 
corporation and thus cannot be held liable for illegality of which they were 
ignorant.  Even so, directors who remain unaware of the internal controls 
within the compliance program can rest assured that the demand 
requirement will not be excused.  The solution to this Gordian knot is to 
embrace the McCall court’s approach to demand futility.  In Part IV, I will 
 
 52.  Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 141 (Del. 2008). 
 53.  DeSimone, 924 A.2d 908, 940 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 54.  Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 55.  DeSimone, 924 A.2d at 940. 
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discuss this solution in the context of cases involving journalistic reporting 
of corporate malfeasance. 
E. Red Flags 
Although Caremark represents a fundamental shift away from the 
jurisprudence of Graham, Delaware law maintains an important part of the 
analysis that prevailed under Graham, the concept of the red flag.  
Caremark, although turning Graham on its head, did not affect discussions 
of red flags in cases and law review articles.
56
 
So what is a red flag?  In concept, a red flag is a warning, an 
indication of the presence of a risk.  It is a signal to slow down and apprise 
oneself of the nature of the risk and to adjust course if necessary.  Red flags 
can arise in many contexts, as recent cases, including McCall v. Scott,
57
 
have illustrated.  A red flag can be a report from the compliance program,
58
 
the initiation of a governmental investigation or a private lawsuit,
59
  a 
warning from external auditors that they are concerned about their ability to 
issue a clean opinion on a financial statement can be a red flag,
60
  or a 
newspaper report detailing illegal behavior.
61
  More subtle red flags can be 
found in aberrations in internally generated data.
62
  The directors in McCall 
had almost all of these red flags waved before them.
63
 
Although we can view Graham as the origin of the proposition that red 
flags put a board on notice of a particular instance of the duty to monitor, it 
is interesting to note that in Graham itself, the court was reluctant to take 
the idea too seriously.  The plaintiffs in Graham argued that a 1937 consent 
decree should have sufficed to inform the board that there was a “biting 
dog” on the premises.
64
  The court was not persuaded that the decree was 
 
 56.  See, e.g., In re SFBC Int’l Sec. and Derivative Litig., 495 F. Supp. 2d 477, 485 
(D.N.J. 2007) (“The Complaint, however, alleges endemic mismanagement of the company, 
raising plenty of red flags concerning the improper and even possibly illegal practices in 
which the company was engaged.”); In re Baxter Int’l, Inc. S’holders Litig., 654 A.2d 1268, 
1271 (Del.Ch.1995) (“[T]he complaint does not plead with particularity what obvious 
danger signs were ignored or what additional measures the directors should have taken.”).  
 57.  McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 818-19 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 58.  Id. at 818-21. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id.  
 62.  See, e.g., id. (finding a red flag where, in a Medicaid case, the highest bracket 
billing claims rose from 31% to 76% and then to 93%, when the hospital across the street 
was only billing 28% of its claims at the highest rate).  
 63.  Id.  
 64.  Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 129 (Del. 1963). 
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“cause for suspicion”
65
 so as to require the directors to “ferret out 
wrongdoing.”
66
  In recent decades, courts have applied more careful 
judicial scrutiny of circumstances that ought to pique a board’s attention 
and thus implicate the duty to monitor. 
In Dobler v. Montgomery Cellular Holding Co., the court agreed with 
the plaintiffs that an abrupt shift in lending patterns between Montgomery 
Cellular Holding Company (“MCHC”) and its affiliates raised a red flag.
67
  
The facts of the case showed that during an earlier phase of the company’s 
operations, entities affiliated with MCHC had advanced money to MCHC, 
with the outstanding amount totaling $12 million.
68
  After a change of 
control of the company, the advances began flowing in the opposite 
direction, with MCHC advancing funds in excess of $13 million to its 
affiliates.
69
  In response to these facts, the court stated that “while 
‘advances’ to affiliates in some contexts may be entirely proper, the 
plaintiffs have provided credible evidence that these ‘advances’ are 
suspect.”
70
  The willingness of the Dobler court to treat this conceivably 
innocuous pattern of transactions as a red flag indicates that the courts have 
evolved since Graham. 
This is not to say, however, that the Delaware courts have uniformly 
embraced an expansive approach to red flags.  In In re Citigroup Inc. 
Shareholders Litigation, for example, the Court of Chancery dismissed a 
complaint for failure to show that demand should be excused, indicating a 
restrictive attitude toward red flags.
71
  The plaintiffs had brought the action 
against Citigroup in the wake of the collapse of Enron Corporation, 
claiming that Citigroup had been complicit in Enron’s fraudulent off-
balance sheet financing.
72
  The following paragraph from the court’s 
opinion reveals the problems courts have had in defining what constitutes a 
red flag in duty to monitor cases: 
At argument, in response to questioning by the court, the 
plaintiffs’ counsel suggested that the Amended Complaint 
adequately alleges a series of “red flags” that should have put the 
director defendants on notice of the offensive conduct or the 
weakness of the corporation’s internal controls.  Further 
 
 65.  Id. at 133.  
 66.  Id.  
 67.  Dobler v. Montgomery Cellular Holding Co. Inc., No. Civ.A. 18105 NC, Civ.A. 
18499, 2001 WL 1334182, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 2001). 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  In re Citigroup Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 19827, 2003 WL 21384599, at *2 (Del. 
Ch. June 5, 2003). 
 72.  Id. 
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questioning revealed, however, that these “red flags” are 
comprised of a series of internal corporate memoranda and e-
mails disseminated at the level of Citigroup’s operating 
subsidiaries.  There is nothing in the Amended Complaint to 
suggest or to permit the court to infer that any of these ever came 
to the attention of the board of directors or any committee of the 
board.  How, exactly, a member of the Citigroup board of 
directors was supposed to be put on inquiry notice by something 
he or she never saw or heard of is not explained.  The answer to 
the question is obvious.  “Red flags” are only useful when they 
are either waived in one’s face or displayed so that they are 
visible to the careful observer.
 73 
Assuming that these internal memoranda detailed Citigroup’s 
knowledge of or involvement in the accounting irregularities at Enron, the 
court’s refusal to label the documents as a red flag seems troubling.  At a 
minimum, it is difficult to reconcile this position with the treatment of the 
pattern of advances in Dobler, a case decided just two years earlier. 
It appears that the difference between the two cases lies in the scale of 
the corporation in question.  MCHC was a small cellular phone service, 
with relatively few employees and, presumably, close contact among all the 
parties involved.  In such firms, the board is likely to have a much more 
comprehensive view of the totality of the transactions the firm undertakes.  
By contrast, at an institution such as Citigroup, the scope of operations, the 
worldwide footprint, the enormous volume of transactions, and the 
significant outside demands on its high-profile directors makes it easier for 
a court to conclude that memoranda distributed at executive meetings of 
corporate subsidiaries are somehow invisible to the board of directors of 
the parent corporation.  This conclusion, however, undercuts the entire 
conception of the duty to monitor under Caremark.  Caremark’s scheme of 
monitoring and compliance is premised on the recognition that directors of 
large corporations usually are  unable to have actual knowledge of the day-
to-day events in the life of their firms.  For this reason, the law permits 
them to delegate their compliance obligations to employees who sift 
through voluminous information and funnel significant nuggets of 
information upward to the board.  To say that the memoranda were not red 
flags because the board never saw them is to miss the point entirely, and 
also suggests that such firms are, from the point of view of ethics and 
compliance, too big to manage. 
In re Abbott Laboratories Derivative S’holders Litig.
74
 is also a useful 
case for understanding the Delaware courts’ conception of red flags.  
 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2003). 
BORDEN_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/21/2013  4:54 PM 
938 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15:4 
 
Abbott Laboratories involved the company’s non-compliance with Food 
and Drug Administration regulations in the manufacture of medical 
diagnostic devices and kits.
75
  After performing a routine inspection of 
Abbott Labs’ facilities, the FDA sent the company “formal certified 
Warning Letters.”
76
  The Wall Street Journal ran a story reporting on the 
FDA’s concerns.
77
  Two years passed without the company remedying the 
problems.  This led to more Warning Letters and more news reports.
78
 
Finally, after six years of noncompliance, with the accompanying 
regulatory Warning Letters and ample coverage in the press, the FDA filed 
a complaint in federal court, along with a consent decree.
79
  Under the 
consent decree, Abbott Labs agreed to pay a $100 million fine, suspend 
operations until it was in full compliance, and withdraw and destroy 
previously manufactured kits worth an estimated $250 million.
80
 
In denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court emphasized 
the board’s failure to act upon the numerous red flags and held that the 
complaint supported a theory of liability based on a “conscious disregard of 
a known risk” or severe recklessness.
81
  Hillary Sale nicely summarized the 
Abbott Laboratories case and the significance of red flags: 
The allegations, of course, had not been proved.  They are, 
however, revealing about when boards can get in trouble for not 
insisting on better internal information or for not intensifying 
their monitoring or changing their approach when the situation 
warrants.  In the face of red flags, boards need to ask questions 
and question answers.  The failure to do so raises questions about 
whether the board has fulfilled its good-faith obligations and 
about whether the board has acted with “conscious disregard” of 
its responsibilities or engaged in behavior sufficiently egregious 
to surface concerns about intentionality.
82
 
If the good faith standard hinges on what the directors knew, or ought 
to have known, and it is not possible to get discovery to determine what the 
directors actually knew because of demand requirements, then the focus for 
plaintiffs shifts to a determination of what they ought to have known.  My 
claim is that defendants ought to know what is written about their firms in 
the newspapers for two reasons.  First, such information is now public, and, 
 
 75.  Id. at 799 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. at 800. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. at 801. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 811. 
 82.  Hillary Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 742 
(2007). 
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as long as it appears in a prominent national publication, there is no reason 
to constrain the concept of constructive knowledge so as to exclude it. 
Second, if the information could be discovered by an outside journalist 
relying on only his own initiative and shoe leather, then that information  is 
the type that a reasonably well-designed and implemented compliance 
program ought to have discovered and communicated to the board.  Either 
way, the information ought to be sufficient to raise genuine issues of 
material fact about either the board’s actual knowledge or the adequacy of 
the compliance program so as to allow the plaintiffs to survive the motion 
to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment.  By allowing such cases 
to continue beyond the summary judgment phase, Delaware would enable 
competitive forces to test the efficacy of the compliance program under 
review, and would put all corporations on notice that their compliance 
programs will have to perform at least as well as the outside monitoring 
carried out by journalists.  Part IV will expand on this claim. 
 
II. SCHOLARLY ATTENTION TO THE ROLE OF NEWS MEDIA IN 
LAW 
The remainder of this article will concern itself with the possibility 
that corporate monitors outside of the firm, namely journalists, can make 
and have made positive contributions to Caremark litigation and, by 
extension, to both corporate governance and social welfare.  It will also 
describe a plan by which the courts can step out of the way of competitive 
forces that can improve corporate compliance programs. 
A. The Recent Surge in Attention to Journalism in Legal Scholarship 
In recent years, legal scholars have begun focusing their attention in a 
more serious fashion on the role of journalism and the news media in law.  
Law review articles for decades had been rife with cursory references to the 
supporting role that news media might play in legal reform, public 
awareness of legal issues, and the process of litigation.  However, beyond 
these superficial, if ubiquitous, mentions, precious little in the way of 
careful, systematic investigations of the role of journalism in law could be 
found in the literature. 
In the last decade, however, scores of articles have touched on the 
intersection of law and journalism.  This is a natural topic in areas of law 
and legal practice that intimately connect with the news media.  Thus, 
much legal literature focuses on the intersection of journalism and the first 
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amendment.
83
  Similarly, articles exploring the techniques lawyers may 
employ in using journalists as public relations tools in managing litigation 
are plentiful.
84
  The years since the Valerie Plame–Scooter Libby affair 
have seen a burst of law review articles on the journalistic privilege to keep 
anonymous sources hidden from governmental inquiry.
85
  Other literature 
concerns the portrayal of racial minorities in the media and its effect on 
criminal law and procedure and the rights of defendants.
86
 
 
 83.  See, e.g., Eunnice Eun, Journalists Caught in the Crossfire: Robert Novak, the 
First Amendment, and Journalist’s Duty of Confidentiality, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1073, 
1073 (2005) (“[J]ournalists should be able to publish information in the public interest 
without being restrained by fear of criminal charges.”); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen 
Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515, 522 (2007) (“Since the 
1970s the Court has routinely rejected claims that the press was entitled to any special First 
Amendment protections that the public at large did not equally enjoy.”); Mark Weidemaier, 
Balancing, Press Immunity, and the Compatibility of Tort Law with the First Amendment, 
82 MINN. L. REV. 1695, 1697 (1998) (“The press enjoys substantial newsgathering freedom, 
and there is currently little evidence that newsgathering tort suits have substantial First 
Amendment implications.”). 
 84.  See, e.g., Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, 
Installment One: Broadening the Role of Corporate Attorneys, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
1259, 1283 (2009) (“[L]awyers must ensure that the right information is disclosed in the 
proper manner and PR executives help the lawyer determine what a consumer or stockholder 
might consider ‘material’ and therefore necessary to disclose.”); Kathleen F. Brickey, From 
Boardroom to Courtroom to Newsroom: The Media and the Corporate Governance 
Scandals, 33 J. CORP. L. 625, 659-60 (2008) (noting how “[t]he combination of articles, 
background information, documents, exhibits, transcripts, and blogs available via the 
Internet . . . allowed interested members of the public to learn about the rise and fall of 
Enron and to follow the trial on a real-time basis.”). 
 85.  See, e.g., Mark Gomsak, The Free Flow of Information Act of 2006: Settling the 
Journalist’s Privilege Debate, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 597, 599 (2007) (“This Note posits that a 
federally legislated qualified journalist’s privilege would . . . curb the judiciary’s disregard 
of the confidentiality of journalists’ sources . . . .”); William E. Lee, The Priestly Class: 
Reflections on A Journalist’s Privilege, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 635, 636 (2006) 
(“[M]any journalists regard judicial orders compelling the identification of confidential 
sources as an ‘assault on journalistic freedom.’”); Jeffrey S. Nestler, The Underprivileged 
Profession: The Case for Supreme Court Recognition of the Journalist’s Privilege, 154 U. 
PA. L. REV. 201, 204 (2005) (“The phrase ‘freedom of the press’ . . . can support the creation 
of a privilege protecting reporters from having to reveal the nature of confidential 
information they received from sources who wished to remain anonymous.”). 
 86.  See, e.g., Neil. F. Carlson & Leonard M. Baynes, Rethinking the Discourse on 
Race: A Symposium on How the Lack of Racial Diversity in the Media Affects Social Justice 
and Policy, 21 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 575, 579 (2007) (noting that media coverage 
of Hurricane Katrina “confirmed and fed into existing negative stereotypes of African 
Americans as violent and prone to crime.”); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of 
the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social 
Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1261-75 (1992) (documenting the social construction of 
racial stereotypes, particularly through entertainment and pop-culture media); John 
Tehranian, The Last Minstrel Show? Racial Profiling, the War on Terrorism and the Mass 
Media, 41 CONN. L. REV. 781, 798 (2009) (“Racial profiling in the war on terrorism has 
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Legal scholars have paid somewhat less attention to the intersection of 
journalism and other legal topics.  One can find far fewer articles on the 
impact of journalists on topics such as environmental law,
87
 bankruptcy,
88
 
and antitrust law.
89
  In recent years, a small body of literature has emerged 
on the role of journalists in corporate and securities law and corporate 
governance.
90
 
In a 2007 article, I surveyed the roles of financial journalists in 
corporate law and corporate governance.
91
  The article arose from the 
recognition, in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals, that 
corporate law can only go so far in promoting its goal of minimizing the 
agency costs that arise from the divergence of ownership and management 
that is the hallmark of the corporate form.
92
  Without effective enforcement 
mechanisms, the law has only a limited capacity to affect the behavior of 
corporate actors, particularly when those actors are bent on engaging in 
economically inefficient action, whether by failing to diligently and 
carefully discharge their duties pursuant to the corporate contract with 
 
betrayed our fundamental constitutional values and undermined our fealty to non-
discrimination principles. . . . [I]n that regard, the mass media has a central role.”). 
 87.  See, e.g., Molly J. Walker Wilson & Megan P. Fuchs, Publicity, Pressure, and 
Environmental Legislation: The Untold Story of Availability Campaigns, 30 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2147 (2009) (describing the impact of journalists on public perception of the debate 
over climate change and the consequent impact on legislation). 
 88.  See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby, Negotiating Bankruptcy Legislation Through the 
News Media, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1091 (2005) (arguing that news media helped reframe 
debates about bankruptcy law and legislation). 
 89.  See, e.g., Donald R. Simon, Big Media: Its Effect on the Marketplace of Ideas and 
How to Slow the Urge to Merge, 20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 247, 251 (2002) 
(discussing the ways that big media mergers tend to impoverish public discourse and the 
marketplace of ideas). 
 90.  See, e.g., Borden, The Role of Financial Journalists in Corporate Governance, 12 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 311 (2007) [hereinafter Borden, Financial Journalists]; 
Damian Tambini, What Are Financial Journalists For?, 11 JOURNALISM STUDIES 158 
(2010) (questioning the degree to which financial journalists understand their role in 
corporate governance); Cheryl L. Wade, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Ethical Corporate 
Climates: What the Media Reports; What the General Public Knows, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. 
& COM. L. 421 (2008) (addressing the news media’s role in informing the public about 
corporate ethics). 
 91.  Borden, Financial Journalists, supra note 89. 
 92.  See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 207-10 (2004) (explaining the 
weaknesses in the system of shareholder voting, its negligible frequency, and SEC proposals 
to strengthen it); id. at 45-48 (explaining both the procedural hurdles and substantive rules 
of law that inhibit shareholders from successfully pursuing claims against managers and 
directors in derivative actions); Michael Klausner, The Limits of Corporate Law in 
Promoting Good Governance, in RESTORING TRUST IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 91-93 (Jay W. 
Lorsch, Leslie Berlowitz & Andy Zelleke eds., 2005) (explaining the general weakness of 
shareholder voting and derivative actions as disciplinary mechanisms). 
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shareholders, by wrongfully appropriating corporate assets, or by harming 
society at large.  In a 2005 article, Michael Klausner argued that scholars 
should focus their attention upon extralegal forms of enforcement in order 
to generate new insights that might contribute to a better culture of 
corporate governance and adherence to law.
93
  Many scholars explored the 
role of gatekeepers—non-governmental actors such as lawyers, bankers, 
certified public accountants, and securities analysts–in preventing corporate 
wrongdoing.
94
  A few articles explored the concept of “shaming” to restrain 
the instincts of corporate actors.
95
  My article focused on journalists. 
Journalists perform various functions, including:  investigating fraud,
96
 
catalyzing the legal process by calling wrongdoing to the attention of 
governmental actors and private lawyers,
97
 promoting deterrence through 
shaming,
98
 and affecting the legislative process.
99
  For each of these 
categories, the article chronicled actual cases in which journalists 
succeeded in influencing corporate law and governance.  In one other 
category, the role I posited for journalists was purely speculative.  I 
hypothesized that journalists could influence the standard of review in 
Caremark cases involving director liability for failure to monitor illegal 
 
 93.  Michael Klausner, The Limits of Corporate Law in Promoting Good Governance, 
in RESTORING TRUST IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 97-98 (Jay W. Lorsch, Leslie Berlowitz & 
Andy Zelleke eds., 2005) 
 94.  See, e.g., Jill. E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst As Agent: 
Rethinking the Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1040-56 (2003) (analyzing 
the role of security analysts in identifying and preventing corporate wrongdoing); see 
generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning 
Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 353-360 [hereinafter Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure) 
(discussing the pros and cons of attorneys serving as gatekeepers); John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid”, 57 BUS. LAW. 1403 (2002) 
[hereinafter Coffee, Understanding Enron] (discussing the apparent failure in the market for 
gatekeepers). 
 95.  See, e.g., Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 959, 966 (1999) (“[I]ncreasing evidence suggests that well-crafted shaming 
sanctions-especially as applied to top-level corporate executives-can serve as an effective 
influence on individual and corporate behavior.”); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and 
Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1268 (1999) (stating that reports highlighting 
shortcomings of directors, “with their consequence of shaming and the loss of esteem, may 
have been one factor in making directors more attentive.”); Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. 
Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 42 J. L. & ECON. 365 (1999) (discussing the deterrent effects of shaming federal 
white-collar offenders). 
 96.  Borden, Financial Journalists, supra note 89, at 332-56. 
 97.  Id.; see also Michael J. Borden, PSLRA, SLUSA, and Variable Annuities: 
Overlooked Side Effects of a Potent Legislative Medicine, 55 MERCER L. REV. 681, 715 
(2004) (“Beginning in early 1998, reporters in the financial press began to call attention to 
the problem of annuities being sold into qualified plans.”). 
 98.  Borden, Financial Journalists, supra note 89, at 332-56. 
 99.  Id. 
BORDEN_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/21/2013  4:54 PM 
2013] THE ROLE OF JOURNALISTS IN CAREMARK LITIGATION 943 
 
behavior in the interior of a corporation.  I suggested that if journalists are 
regularly able to discover corporate wrongdoing before the corporation’s 
compliance program is able to learn about it and report it to the board, then 
there is good reason to believe that the good faith standard of Caremark 
and its progeny is defective and should be changed.
100
  This claim rests on 
the evident laxity of the Caremark standard and the consequent suspicion 
that it strips corporate boards of any incentive to ensure that compliance 
programs are more than paper tigers.  Since a vibrant and well-designed 
compliance program should know what is going on within a corporation, it 
stands to reason that cases in which journalists, operating without subpoena 
power, are able to learn more than the inside monitors deserve a close look 
by the courts.  In derivative actions, however, courts rarely examine how 
the compliance program actually functions.  As we have seen, this is a 
result of the pleading standards in a derivative action, including the demand 
requirement, together with the fact that plaintiffs are not entitled to 
discovery until they have survived the demand phase. 
To be sure, there may be cases in which compliance programs are 
carried out with vigor and integrity, and yet still fail to discover the actions 
of determined and furtive malefactors.  In such instances, journalistic 
reporting may not be instrumental in a shareholder derivative action, but 
may nonetheless lead to a governmental legal process that benefits society 
by putting an end to the illegal activity.
101
 
III. JOURNALISTS CAN MONITOR COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 
Journalists can be very effective in detecting corporate misbehavior.  
There are, however, limits to the kinds of contributions journalists can be 
expected to make to corporate law and corporate governance; for example, 
while they may not be able to detect merely inefficient management, they 
may be good at detecting affirmative wrongdoing.  Journalists do so in a 
variety of ways.  They cultivate contacts within both corporations and 
governmental agencies, receive information from leakers or 
whistleblowers, and use their skepticism and diligence to process large 
amounts of information from various sources, piecing together disparate 
fragments of data to create a coherent picture of what is happening within a 
corporation or an industry. 
Still, some might doubt the wisdom of relying on journalists to 
promote good corporate governance.  For example, journalists are not 
experts in law.  They might over-sensationalize a story, which has, at its 
 
 100.  Id. at 343-50. 
 101.  See In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(involving journalistic reporting by both The Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg News). 
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foundation, unflattering, albeit legal, behavior.  Furthermore, many of the 
best journalists work within institutions that sometimes have interests that 
impede a journalist’s work.  For example, the fear of a libel action can 
cause an editor to spike a story.  This is what happened in Dirks v. SEC,
102
 
an insider trading case that illustrates the role of financial journalists in 
corporate governance.  In Dirks, a company called Equity Funding was 
engaged in a massive financial fraud.
103
  An employee named Ronald 
Secrist informed Raymond Dirks, a securities analyst covering the 
company, about the scheme.
104
  Dirks quickly called William Blundell, a 
Wall Street Journal reporter he knew, hoping the Journal would run a story 
on Equity Funding and that the SEC would, in turn, investigate the 
company.
105
  Blundell’s editors refused to publish Blundell’s story, fearing 
a libel suit.
106
  The information finally came out, but in a roundabout 
fashion that led to Dirks being investigated for insider trading violations.
107
  
The saga of Secrist, Dirks, and Blundell stands as a cautionary tale about 
the limitations on journalists’ ability to affect corporate law and 
governance. 
Another impediment to journalists’ monitoring is their lack the 
resources and expertise.  Securities analysts, some would argue, are in a far 
better position to uncover the kinds of accounting and securities fraud that 
lie at the heart of many Caremark cases.  Securities analysts have much 
greater technical expertise than financial journalists, are paid to focus on a 
small number of firms within a particular industry, have greater access to 
chief financial officers and other top executives, and have financial 
incentives to know the truth about a company’s financial status.  In sum, 
securities analysts’ position with respect to resources, expertise, access, and 
incentives suggests that journalists are unlikely to add any value to the 
search for truth in corporate financial reporting.  Nevertheless, we must not 
forget that executives at Enron successfully deceived the securities analysts 
for years before journalists revealed their accounting and securities fraud.
108
 
Indeed, the superiority of securities analysts over journalists is but one 
of two major reasons why Caremark cases involving accounting or 
securities fraud are not good candidates for a journalistic contribution.  The 
second reason stems from public corporations’ substantial redundancy in 
the development, review, and reporting of financial information.  
 
 102.  Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 103.  Id. at 649-50. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. at 650-51. 
 108.  See Borden, Financial Journalists, supra note 89, at 335-38 (discussing Jonathan 
Weil’s groundbreaking investigation of Enron after years of fraud). 
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Companies generate their own financial numbers, which are audited by 
independent auditors.  Part of the audit includes a review of internal 
controls, the systems in place to prevent accounting fraud.  There is internal 
generation of data, which includes internal controls, followed by outside 
review by independent auditors; finally there is the requirement by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act that the audited financial statements be certified by the 
CEO and CFO, both of whom are typically board members.  Given the 
layers of scrutiny already applied to corporations’ internal controls, a 
journalist may not be able to find information not already caught in the 
company’s own wide reviewing net. 
This is not to suggest that some corporations are not guilty of 
fraudulent financial reporting.  Rather, given the rigidly structured review 
of the financial reporting process, it is highly unlikely that journalists will 
be able to outperform the internal monitors.  If there is fraud in financial 
reporting, the insiders are very likely to know about it.  Of course, 
accounting and securities fraud can be perpetrated without the board’s 
knowledge. In such cases, however, it is much more likely that the 
securities analysts will detect the fraud than that journalists will.
109
  
Nevertheless, as the rest of this article will show, journalists can play an 
important role in Caremark litigation, and in so doing, can both enhance 
shareholder welfare and minimize social harm that results from corporate 
illegality. 
 
A. Journalists Have Demonstrated an Ability to Shape the Course of 
Caremark Litigation. 
Two cases brought in recent years demonstrate the capacity for 
journalists to influence Caremark litigation.  In both of these cases, 
journalistic investigations have revealed the kinds of liability-creating 
activities that give rise to a Caremark claim.  In each case, the journalists 
discovered the information before the respective corporation’s compliance 
system did and reported the information to the board, supporting the claim 
that Delaware’s good faith standard has been insufficient to induce 
appropriate monitoring. 
 
 109.  Enron stands as a surprising counter-example.  The perpetrators of financial fraud 
at Enron were, for various reasons, able to hoodwink both analysts and SEC examiners 
alike.  It was actually a journalist from a regional edition of The Wall Street Journal who 
was able to piece together disparate strands of Enron’s financial disclosure and accounting 
methods to demonstrate that Enron was reporting inflated earnings. The article he wrote was 
the first in a cascading series of revelations that unfolded over a period of months, leading to 
the implosion of the company.  Borden, Financial Journalists, supra note 89, at 335-38.   
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McCall v. Scott was a shareholder derivative action brought against 
the directors of Columbia/HCA, a corporation that operated 45% of all for-
profit hospitals in the United States.
110
  HCA had become the target of 
multiple federal investigations for fraud.  Management had set aggressive 
targets for profit growth across its network of hospitals.
111
  The plaintiffs 
alleged that the firm could only meet these growth targets by violating 
federal Medicare and Medicaid laws and regulations.
112
  Specifically, the 
plaintiffs alleged that HCA
113
 employees engaged in widespread 
“upcoding”—billing Medicare and Medicaid for more costly interventions 
than those actually required or provided.
114
 
The district court dismissed the derivative action for failure to satisfy 
the demand requirement, ruling that the plaintiffs had failed to show “that a 
majority of the directors were interested or lacked independence.”
115
  The 
Delaware circuit court reversed this dismissal under the demand futility test 
of Rales v. Blasband,
116
 which the circuit court interpreted as requiring a 
determination of “whether or not the particularized factual allegations . . . 
create a reasonable doubt that, as of the time the complaint is filed, [a 
majority of] the board of directors could have properly exercised its 
independent and disinterested business judgment in responding to a 
demand.”
117
  The circuit court held that plaintiffs can establish such 
reasonable doubt when the “particularized allegations in the complaint 
present ‘a substantial likelihood’ of liability on the part of the director.”
118
  
In so holding, the court pushed the demand inquiry beyond the sterile 
principle of director independence to include consideration of the facts of 
the case and their likelihood of satisfying the substantive legal standard of 
the cause of action. 
In reviewing the allegations, the circuit court paid careful attention to 
an astonishing bit of investigative journalism on the part of three reporters 
from The New York Times.
119
  The Times’ investigation included a 
sophisticated statistical analysis of over 30 million records of Medicare 
 
 110.  McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 818-19 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 111.  Id. at 819. 
 112.  Id.  
 113.  The alleged wrongdoing occurred before the merger of Columbia Health System, 
Inc. and HCA. 
 114.  Id. at 814.  
 115.  Id. at 815. 
 116.  Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993). 
 117.  McCall, 239 F.3d at 816. 
 118.  Id. at 817 (quoting Rales, 634 A.2d 927). 
 119.  Martin Gottlieb, Kurt Eichenwald and Josh Barbanel, Biggest Hospital Operator 
Attracts Federal Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1997, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/28/business/biggest-hospital-operator-attracts-federal-
inquiries.html. 
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patients treated in hospitals in Florida and Texas in 1995.
120
  This enormous 
data set included both patients treated by HCA and, for comparison, 
patients treated by other providers.
121
  In this remarkable study, the 
reporters: 
[M]atched records of these patients with bills for hospital 
readmission, admissions to rehabilitation and skilled nursing 
units, outpatient services and doctor bills within 30 days of 
discharge.  To account for differences among patients, hospital 
stays were grouped into 1,500 categories that took into account 
the type and severity of patient conditions.  Costs figures and 
referral rates were then calculated and adjusted to account for 
differences in conditions.
122
 
During the course of the investigation, the Times reporters met with 
unidentified HCA officials to discuss their reporting.
123
  They also 
contacted the federal Medicare agency, which pursued its own 
investigation.
124
  Eventually, the FBI conducted an extensive investigation 
that culminated in raids of several HCA offices in 1997.
125
  The Times 
refrained from publishing its story until the FBI undertook the first of its 
raids.  In 2002, Columbia/HCA completed its settlements with a host of 
governmental agencies, paying a total of nearly $1.7 billion.
126
 
Because of the procedural posture of the case, the circuit court opinion 
did not include any findings of fact concerning whether the board had 
learned from internal channels about the upcoding activities before the 
Times reporters discovered it.  Nevertheless, the court relied heavily on the 
Times report and the federal criminal investigation it sparked to reach its 
conclusion.  The court found that, under the demand futility test of Rales v. 
Blasband, the plaintiffs’ allegations presented a substantial likelihood of 
liability on the part of the directors and thus raised a reasonable doubt that 
a majority of the board could exercise its independent and disinterested 
business judgment in responding to a demand.
127
  The derivative action 
settled in 2003 for an undisclosed sum, with HCA also agreeing to 
significant changes in the structure and operation of its compliance 
program.
128
 
 
 120.  Id.  
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Associated Press, Hospital Chain Ends Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2002 at 
C1. 
 127.  McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 818-19 (6th Cir. 2001).  
 128.  N.Y.C. COMPREHENSIVE ANN. FIN. REP. OF THE COMPTROLLER, at xiv (2003), 
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McCall thus shows that where courts are willing to consider the actual 
allegations of wrongdoing contained in the complaint at the demand stage, 
journalistic reporting can crucially affect plaintiffs’ ability to have their 
case heard and obtain a recovery.  Moreover, the settlement indicates that 
compliance at HCA was not satisfactory.  The alterations to the compliance 
program would not have occurred without the investigative work of the 
journalists and the court of appeal’s willingness to overrule the district 
court on the issue of demand futility. 
In re SFBC International Securities and Derivative Litigation
129
 
presents another case where journalists were the first to uncover suspect 
corporate activity that led to a Caremark claim.  SFBC, which had come to 
be known as PharmaNet Development Group, Inc. (“PDG”), managed the 
implementation of clinical testing on behalf of pharmaceutical 
companies.
130
  Between 2003 and 2006 PDG operated clinical trials in 
Florida and in two cities in Quebec Province, Canada.
131
  PDG’s business 
plan involved rapid growth and expansion, and relied on inducing 
pharmaceutical companies to enter into service contracts by assuring them 
that PDG could “quickly enlist study participants and process clinical 
trials” at its large facilities in Miami and Montreal.
132
  For a number of 
years, PDG’s practices resulted in large profits and impressive growth. 
As it turned out, PDG’s clinical practices involved staggering ethical 
violations that caused severe health problems for several of its study 
participants and endangered the safety of many others.
133
  In addition, PDG 
schemed to conceal its actions by engaging two Institutional Review 
Boards
134
 (“IRBs”), which were unable to render objective analyses of 
PDG’s clinical practices because of conflicts of interest.
135
  One of the 
IRBs, known as Lee Coast, shared offices with a subsidiary of PDG.
136
  
Plaintiffs alleged that employees of this IRB were “paid directly by PDG’s 
accounting office and that Lee Coast did not maintain its own books and 
records.”
137
  The other, Southern IRB, was owned by the wife of one of the 
defendants, a vice president of clinical operations.
138
  Without an impartial 
 
http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/bureaus/acc/CAFR-FYJun03/CAFR-FY-Ending-
June03.pdf. 
 129.  In re SFBC Int’l Sec. and Derivative Litig., 495 F. Supp. 2d 477 (D.N.J. 2007). 
 130.  Id. at 480. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  IRBs are private organizations authorized by the FDA to oversee clinical trials to 
ensure safety and compliance with FDA regulations relating to clinical testing processes. 
 135.  In re SFBC, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 480-81. 
 136.  Id. at 481. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id.  
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review of the clinical trials, PDG was able to flout FDA regulations, 
industry standards, and biomedical ethics, thereby endangering the health 
and safety of numerous study participants.  
Reporters from Bloomberg News conducted a year-long investigation 
of safety issues in pharmaceutical testing.
139
  Their reporting culminated in 
the publication of a 28-page report
140
 and several follow up stories that 
detailed a number of ethical and safety violations, and served as a primary 
source for both the plaintiff’s complaint and the court’s analysis of the 
case.
141
  Bloomberg reported that volunteers “participated in more than one 
clinical trial . . . at the same time . . . ignoring required waiting periods.”
142
  
In addition, PDG “threatened to arrange federal deportation of Latin 
American immigrants who disclosed health risks in clinical trials.”
143
  
Journalists also found that volunteers at a testing center contracted 
tuberculosis and were not quarantined, resulting in the spread of the disease 
to other study participants.
144
  The reporters interviewed professors of 
medicine from Harvard Medical School and the University of Minnesota 
Medical School, who condemned PDG’s practices.  One said, “‘[t]hey had 
a person coughing up blood, to allow him to expose others to TB is 
wrong . . . . I’ve never heard of this happening in a clinical trial before . . . . 
I’ve seen TB spread like this in a prison.’”
145
  Another opined, “‘[t]his story 
suggests a serious lapse in the most basic care of patients exposed to a 
known communicable disease.  The breach of responsibility is 
egregious.’”
146
 
After Bloomberg published its information about PDG, the SEC, 
FDA, and the United States Senate investigated the wrongdoing.  As a 
result of these revelations, PDG shuttered its Miami testing operations, saw 
the resignation of its CEO, its president, and its chief legal counsel, and 
settled with its shareholders for nearly $30 million.
147
  As for the derivative 
litigation, a district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss for 
 
 139.  David Evans, Michael Smith, and Liz Willen, Big Pharma’s Shameful Secret, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS, (Dec. 2005), http://www.dcscience.net/pharma-bloomberg.pdf. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  In re SFBC, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 481. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Michael Smith and David Evans, SFBC Threatens Human Drug Testers for 
Disclosing Health Risks, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 16, 2005), available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&refer=&sid=aH1Vx92KNTWA. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Kristy Barnes, Troubled SFBC Changes its Name in Hope of Changing its 
Fortunes, OUTSOURCING-PHARMA.COM, (Aug. 31, 2006), available at 
http://www.outsourcing-pharma.com/Clinical-Development/Troubled-SFBC-changes-its-
name-in-hope-of-changing-its-fortunes. 
BORDEN_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/21/2013  4:54 PM 
950 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15:4 
 
failure to make demand.
148
  The defendants argued that the complaint failed 
to allege that the directors knew or should have known about the improper 
activities, relying on the claim that the majority of the board was not 
involved in day-to-day operations.
149
  Quoting heavily from the Bloomberg 
report, which furnished the bulk of the allegations in the  complaint, the 
court excused demand, concluding that all of the directors “faced a 
substantial likelihood of personal liability for the misconduct . . . 
preventing them from disinterestedly considering a demand by 
shareholders.”
150
 
IV. DELAWARE SHOULD CHANGE ITS APPROACH TO DEMAND FUTILITY 
AND GOOD FAITH WHEN JOURNALISTS GET THE STORY FIRST 
In summary, we have seen that there are significant problems with the 
jurisprudence of Caremark.  On its face, Caremark seems impotent.
151
  
Fifteen years of litigation experience confirms its inadequacy as an 
inducement to vigorous monitoring.
152
  On a more nuanced level, Caremark 
plaintiffs struggle with the overall weakness of the good faith standard, 
compounded by the difficulties of demand, especially as applied in cases 
like Wood and DeSimone.  To a lesser extent, plaintiffs also face a hurdle in 
courts’  ambivalent attitude toward red flags. 
These elements have combined to make it very difficult for plaintiffs 
to get past a motion to dismiss, which courts commonly grant on the basis 
of the demand requirement.  As a result, the law shields directors from 
having to reveal the actual workings of their compliance programs and 
leaves them free to remain willfully blind to evidence of illegality.  
Furthermore, compliance programs have been allowed to become paper 
tigers, resulting in illegal and dangerous corporate conduct causing public 
harm. 
What, then, can be done about this problem?  I have demonstrated that 
journalists have a distinct capacity to make important contributions in 
Caremark cases.  The remarkable reporting of The New York Times in 
analyzing a vast data set to demonstrate Medicare fraud was a tour de force 
of data analysis in its own right.  From the standpoint of legal process, it 
proved its value in assisting the federal government in bringing HCA into 
conformity with law and reforming its compliance program, while saving 
 
 148.  In re SFBC Int’l Sec. and Derivative Litig., 495 F. Supp. 2d 477, 484-86 (D.N.J. 
2007). 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 152.  See supra Part I. 
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the American taxpayer over two billion dollars through the 2002 
settlement.  The more traditional reporting of Bloomberg News in 
uncovering highly dangerous bioethics violations stands as further evidence 
of the power of journalists to assist in Caremark litigation.  Despite these 
impressive achievements, doctrinal and procedural impediments persist in 
constraining the potential of journalists to make a real impact in 
shareholder derivative litigation, an impact that could enhance shareholder 
welfare, improve the quality of compliance programs, and reduce social 
harm. 
In order to allow journalists to improve the effectiveness of corporate 
compliance, courts must alter their approach to several key doctrinal issues.  
In this Part, I will suggest changes in the way that courts deal with demand, 
red flags, and the overall contours of the good faith doctrine in order to 
strengthen Caremark and improve corporate compliance to both improve 
shareholder welfare and reduce harm to society caused by corporate law 
breaking. 
A. Relaxing the Standard for Demand Futility 
In order to clear the way for the contributions of journalists to make a 
real impact in improving corporate monitoring and compliance with law, 
Delaware courts should adopt a slightly more flexible approach to demand 
futility where plaintiffs allege facts suggesting that outside monitors (i.e. 
journalists) have uncovered corporate illegality before the board appears to 
have become aware of it.  This will force defendants to reveal just what 
information their compliance program has produced, and whether that 
information has made its way to the board.  The revelation of this 
information is essential to ensure that corporate compliance programs are 
actually functioning effectively. 
As we have seen, there is currently some doctrinal disarray 
surrounding the standard for demand futility in cases involving 
nonfeasance (i.e. where the board has failed to act, as opposed to cases 
involving a challenge to an affirmative board decision).  Under McCall v. 
Scott, a court will excuse demand if the complaint includes allegations of 
fact sufficient to indicate a “substantial likelihood of liability on the part of 
[the director].”
153
  Other recent cases impose a scienter requirement, under 
which plaintiffs must show that a majority of the board knew or should 
have known that its conduct was improper, with one case holding that to 
satisfy this requirement, the pleadings must show that the board knew 
about and ignored deficiencies in internal controls within the compliance 
 
 153.  McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 818-19 (6th Cir. 2001). 
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program.
154
 
Delaware courts should turn away from the jurisprudence of 
DeSimone and embrace the holding of McCall.  If DeSimone remains the 
law, a well-counseled board will know that plaintiffs will be unable to 
successfully argue demand futility if the board is unaware of flaws in a 
compliance program’s internal controls.  Indeed, a rational board will 
gladly avoid a careful assessment of internal controls within the 
compliance program.  It is important, in this connection, to note that 
internal controls in compliance are not the same as internal controls in 
financial accounting.  In the latter context, corporations have strong legal 
and financial reasons to establish and monitor effective internal controls.  
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the federal securities laws and Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles and Standards loom as the policemen on 
that beat.  Moreover, it is the job of independent auditors to test, evaluate, 
and opine on the effectiveness of these internal controls.  But when the law 
imports the concept of internal controls to the compliance setting, things 
become rather amorphous.  It is all too easy for a board to remain 
intentionally ignorant of any systematic flaws with internal controls in 
compliance, and, given the limitations on discovery, all too difficult for 
plaintiffs to plead facts indicating that the board was aware of such flaws 
and did nothing about it.  Finally, it is worth mentioning that there is 
nothing in Caremark to indicate that corporate compliance programs must 
have a system of internal controls in the first place. 
Rather than follow an approach that shields ineffective compliance 
from any judicial scrutiny, I propose that courts follow the McCall 
approach to demand, which will excuse demand as futile if plaintiffs can 
show a substantial likelihood of liability on the part of the defendant 
directors.  Since demand is thus tied to the substantive standard for success 
on the merits, it is necessary at this stage to consider the substantive 
standard for liability—the good faith standard.  Recall that under 
Caremark, defendants must show that they have established, in good faith, 
a reasonably designed compliance program, and that, per Chancellor Allen, 
“only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—
such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and 
reporting system [exists]—will establish the lack of good faith that is a 
necessary condition to liability.”
155
 
It is not difficult to read the foregoing and conclude that a plaintiff 
will be unable to surmount the demand requirement in any case in which a 
corporation has an active compliance program in place.  In fact the 
 
 154.  DeSimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 934-35 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 155.  Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971. 
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empirical experience strongly supports this prediction.
156
  Nevertheless, the 
Sixth Circuit  in McCall excused demand on the strength of allegations of 
recklessness in ignoring warning signals that indicated widespread fraud on 
the part of corporate employees, despite the existence of a compliance 
program.
157
  The Delaware courts should thus adopt a slight modification to 
the good faith standard in certain cases. 
B. A Change in the Good Faith Standard 
In order to further ensure that Caremark’s requirement of a 
compliance program becomes a vibrant check on a board’s duty to monitor, 
I suggest that Delaware change its approach to the evaluation of claims of 
breach of the duty of good faith at the demand and summary judgment 
phase.  I propose that where the plaintiff alleges that journalists have 
uncovered illegal corporate action before the corporation has either 
acknowledged the wrongful activity or taken steps to remedy it, the court 
should erect a presumption of bad faith.  Corporate defendants can rebut 
this presumption by showing that the compliance program was aware of the 
problem and had begun to take steps to address it, including notifying the 
board of material illegality.  Plaintiffs should have access to appropriately 
limited discovery to investigate the response of the compliance program.  If 
the defendants were unable to make such a showing sufficient to convince 
the trier of fact, then the inefficacy of the compliance program would 
amount to a breach of the duty of good faith. 
Under this approach, boards will be forced to reveal something of the 
workings of their compliance programs.  Courts and other observers will 
discover how effective the Caremark standard has been in inducing 
effective compliance, and can decide whether it needs to be reformulated.  
More importantly, Delaware corporations will know that they can no longer 
hide behind the legal shield offered by the minimalistic standard for good 
faith and the demand requirement.  Finally, shareholders and society should 
benefit from higher quality compliance programs. 
Those who might fear that this change in the good faith standard will 
go too far toward making directors personally liable for every naughty act 
of corporate employees need not worry.  First, the materiality standard 
ensures that only serious or widespread wrongdoing will lead to a finding 
of bad faith.  Second, the proposed change does not require compliance 
programs to prevent or stop illegal activities; it only requires heightened 
attentiveness and reporting by the compliance department to the board.  
 
 156.  See supra, Section I.D (discussing the demand requirement).  
 157.  McCall, 239 F.3d at 818-19. 
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Only where the external monitoring done by journalists is more effective 
than the internal monitoring of the compliance program will the board even 
be forced to disclose the actions of the compliance officers. 
C. Discovery and the Tools at Hand 
The highly limited availability of discovery in the earlier stages of 
derivative litigation plays an important role in the case for relaxing demand 
requirements where journalistic reporting has uncovered the wrongdoing at 
the center of a duty to monitor case.  Plaintiffs are not entitled to normal 
civil discovery, but Delaware courts consistently exhort them to resort to 
the “tools at hand.”
158
  One such tool is a request for corporate records 
pursuant to section 220 of the DGCL.
159
  However, records requests rarely 
yield meaningful information because the plaintiff must know exactly what 
document she is seeking when making the request,
160
 and also because 
corporate executives are well-versed in the art avoiding paper trails in the 
minutes of board meetings.  The other sources of information referred to as 
the “tools at hand” are SEC filings and news media reporting.
161
  In view of 
the frequency with which the Delaware courts instruct litigants to pursue 
the “tools at hand”, one might expect that information gathered by 
journalists would be afforded some special status.  Ironically, however, the 
Delaware courts persist in dismissing derivative actions while deriding 
plaintiffs for relying simply on newspaper reports.
162
 
There may be many cases in which complaints are hurriedly prepared 
 
 158.  See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 248 (Del. 2000) (“A pleader may rely on 
factual statements in the media as some of the ‘tools at hand’ . . . .”). 
 159.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2013). 
 160.  The scope of a section 220 request is much more limited than civil discovery.  See 
Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 806 A.2d 113, 114 (Del. 2002) (noting that section 220 
“does not open the door to the wide ranging discovery that would be available in support of 
litigation.”).  Rather, a shareholder plaintiff must “make specific and discrete identification, 
with rifled precision, of the documents sought.”  Brehm, T at 266. 
 161.  Brehm, 746 A.2d at 248. 
 162.  See, e.g., In re Citigroup S’holders Litig., No. 19827, 2003 WL 21384599, *1-3 
(Del. Ch. June 5, 2003) (dismissing suit which “[r]el[ied] extensively on information 
gleaned from this governmental report and some other news sources . . . .”).  But see 
Stephen A. Radin, The New Stage of Corporate Governance Litigation: Section 220 
Demands, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 1287 (2006).  Radin offers a thorough exploration of the 
recent jurisprudence of section 200 demands.  Radin reviews the recent cases involving 
requests for records under section 220 and concludes that section 220 affords plaintiffs the 
ability to engage in pre-complaint investigation for the purpose of improving the drafting of 
complaints.  He also notes that “corporations and their counselors accordingly are taking 
steps to minimize litigation risk by ensuring that corporate actions likely to be challenged by 
shareholders . . . are documented in carefully prepared minutes and board materials ready to 
be produced upon receipt of a section 220 demand.”  Id. at 1413. 
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in a race to the courthouse to win what Chancellor Strine has called the 
“filing Olympics.”
163
  Nuisance suits are, to be sure, a problem. Complaints 
that merely recite facts from newspaper articles written in the wake of a 
drop in stock price or after corporate wrongdoing has become public 
knowledge deserve swift dismissal.  It is essential to distinguish the sort of 
lazy ex post fact-gathering by plaintiffs’ lawyers bringing marginal suits 
from the highly valuable investigative reporting of the kind on display in 
McCall and In re SFBC.  This sort of newspaper report deserves particular 
attention by the courts, and special treatment at the pre-trial stages. 
D. Red Flags 
The recent cases addressing red flags indicate an inconsistent 
approach.  At times, the Delaware courts have shown a willingness to take 
a nuanced look at evidence that might constitute a red flag.
164
  Other cases, 
like In re Citigroup, demonstrate a judicial inclination to excuse a board’s 
neglect of prominent red flags, particularly with large corporations.
165
  This 
tendency appears to reflect two considerations.  First, large corporations 
with deep pockets are often the subject of nuisance litigation driven by the 
profit motive of the law firm that can attain lead counsel status by winning 
the race to the courthouse.
166
  Second, boards of giant corporations by 
necessity focus only on the big picture.  They meet infrequently and their 
outside members have significant other engagements that leave them little 
time to follow any but the most important strategic issues.  Neither of these 
reasons stands up to scrutiny. 
As to the problem of nuisance litigation, the restrictive approach to red 
flags must be viewed as part of a filtering apparatus which is important 
both as a matter of judicial economy and protection of corporate resources.  
Yet nothing marks the entire system of shareholder derivative litigation 
more than its highly redundant system of procedural obstacles aimed at 
thwarting frivolous lawsuits.  With so many mechanisms firmly rooted in 
corporate jurisprudence, there is no need to gild the lily by turning a blind 
judicial eye toward real evidence of red flags that are relevant to a 
plaintiff’s claim of a breach of the duty to monitor. 
As to the realities of limitations on directors’ attention, given the 
 
 163.  King v. VeriFone Holdings, Inc. 994 A.2d 354, 355 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 164.  See, e.g., Dobler v. Montgomery Cellular Holding Co., No. CIV.A. 18105 NC, 
CIV.A. 18499, 2001 WL 1334182, *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19,2001) (holding that advances made 
to affiliates were suspect and sufficient red flags). 
 165.  Citigroup, 2003 WL 21384599, at *2. 
 166.  See Roberto Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without a Foundation, 
1991 WL 371124 (LRI), 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55 (1991) (arguing that the interests of 
plaintiffs’ attorneys in derivative actions are poorly aligned with those of the shareholders). 
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many claims made upon their time by big picture considerations both inside 
the corporation and in their lives outside the corporation, this concern is 
misplaced.  It is the job of the compliance department to review all relevant 
issues and funnel material concerns to the board.  Furthermore, the entire 
board need not occupy itself with minor compliance issues.  A committee 
of the board, perhaps composed of inside directors, could occasionally 
review red flag issues brought to their attention by the compliance officer. 
A more expansive approach to red flags, then, can function as an 
important part of the judicial analysis of the demand issue.  If courts are 
willing to excuse demand based on a likelihood of liability on the part of 
the directors, and if that determination turns on whether the defendants 
were reckless in ignoring red flags that ought to have alerted them to illegal 
activity, then Delaware courts should keep an open mind about treating 
serious journalistic reporting as doctrinally significant red flags and turn 
away from the director-friendly biases on display in cases like In re 
Citigroup. 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing has demonstrated that journalists can and should play 
an important role in Caremark litigation.  Talented and well-resourced 
journalists have displayed an ability to outperform corporate compliance 
programs by uncovering socially damaging corporate misdeeds before the 
compliance program.  In cases like Scott, an ambitious journalistic 
investigation enabled the federal government to recover $1.7 billion dollars 
lost to Medicare fraud.  But the federal treasury is not the only loser in such 
cases; shareholders and the public suffer as well.  Thus, the deterrent effect 
of civil liability must also play a role in improving director monitoring of 
corporate illegality.  In order for Caremark’s good faith standard to have 
more than mere aspirational value, more cases must be able to proceed past 
a motion to dismiss so that defendants will be forced to reveal more about 
how their compliance programs actually operate.  Assertions, in the answer 
to a complaint, that there is a compliance program “adequate in design and 
concept” to assure that important information gets to the board are not 
sufficient.  The changes in law recommended in this article will foster a 
healthy competition between the outside and inside monitors that will 
benefit everyone by reducing socially harmful activity through improved 
overall detection of corporate wrongdoing. 
 
 
